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WRONGFUL LIFE: AN INFANT'S CLAIM TO DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
Scientific development in the field of human genetics has
greatly increased our understanding of genetic diseases. Specifi-
cally, advances in medicine enable physicians to detect the pres-
ence of some genetic disorders in fetuses with ninety-nine percent
accuracy.1 A legal problem arises, however, when physicians negli-
gently perform the genetic prediction tests. The law has struggled
with the question of what remedy, if any, is available to parents
and/or their offspring when incorrect genetic information leads to
the birth of a genetically defective infant.- Consequently, litigation
of the issue has produced inconsistent results.3
Case law generally indicates that the law will not allow physi-
cians free reign in the genetic counseling field. Until recently, how-
ever, no court had ever recognized a cause of action brought on
behalf of an infant for injuries received from negligent genetic test-
1. See National Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group, Midtrimester Amniocentesis
for Prenatal Diagnosis, 236 J. Am. MED. A. 1471, 1475 (1976). The accuracy rate for de-
tecting the presence of Tay Sachs or Downs Syndrome is 99.4%. See Howard v. Lecher, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (Cooke, J. dissenting). Prospective par-
ents are administered a simple blood test to determine if either one or both are potential
carriers of Tay Sachs. If either one or both are suspected, a second test, amniocentesis, is
performed by drawing amniotic fluid from the sac in which the child rests. The National
Institute of Health advocates that a much simpler screening test be used prior to the above
steps being taken. See Antenatal Diagnosis: What Is Standard?, 241 J. Am. MAU. A. 1666
(1979).
2. Parents may seek genetic counseling either before conception or after conception to
determine if their potential offspring will be afflicted with genetic disease. This Comment
proceeds from the basic position that the two situations are indistinguishable as to the effect
on an infant's claim to damages. Thus, one purpose of genetic testing is to inform the par-
ents of the status of the fetus. If the genetic tests are negative, i.e., if they show a genetic
deformity, the parents may wish to abort the fetus. An abortion to prevent the birth of a
genetically defective infant is termed "eugenic," while one to prevent harm to the mother is
termed "therapeutic." Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 348 n.4, 408 A.2d 496, 499
n.4 (1979).
3. In New York parents are allowed to recover costs expended for medical treatment of
genetically defective children, but not emotional damages when medical professionals pro-
vide them with inaccurate genetic counseling. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). But see, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8
(1979) (New Jersey allows parents to recover for emotional harm but not economic damage).
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ing.4 A recent California decision, Curlender v. Bio-Science Labo-
ratories,5 became the first decision to recognize an infant's cause of
action for wrongful life.' The basic issue involved in wrongful life
litigation concerns whether genetically deformed infants can re-
cover damages from medical professionals for professional mal-
practice by claiming that but for the faulty genetic counseling they
would never have been born.' This Comment will analyze solely
infants' claims for wrongful life.
Wrongful life claims are brought in tort as negligence actions
within a medical malpractice framework. Consequently, the legal
issues raised by the claim are defined in terms of the traditional
tort framework for establishing negligence.' Each of the elements
4. The Second Department of the New York Appellate Division had recognized an in-
fant's claim for wrongful life only to be overruled by the New York Court of Appeals. See
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1977); Park v. Chessin, 60
A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1977). Both of these decisions were overruled as
companion cases. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978). The Court of Appeals specifically overruled the Second Department's reasoning that
there was a fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole functioning being. Other
state courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967) (child born with injuries caused by mother having had rubella during
pregnancy; physician allegedly failed to warn of risk); Gildinir v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (child born with Tay Sachs after parents were alleg-
edly informed that amniocentesis test was negative); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. Ct.
342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (child born with neuraframatosis after disease manifested itself in
child's siblings; physician failed to investigate). All courts denied the infant's claim for
relief.
5. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). Defendant's appeal to the Supreme
Court of California was denied. At this point no state's highest court has recognized the
cause of action although the California Supreme Court recognized it implicitly by refusing
to review the decision.
6. Wrongful life claims, for the purpose of analyzing an infant's cause of action, pertain
specifically to situations where medical professionals have negligently conducted genetic
testing causing a child to be born with genetic defects by removing the choice to abort the
fetus from the parents. The analysis in this Comment will not include parents' claims in any
way nor will it include infants' claims against their parents for bastardy, Stills v. Gratton, 55
Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976), or against the state for bastardy. Williams v.
State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). In bastardy cases infants
allege an injury to their status by being born illegitimately. No court has ever awarded an
infant damages for a bastardy claim.
7. Infants obviously cannot allege that the medical professional caused the genetic dis-
ease. Rather, they allege that the negligent conduct caused the birth to occur which carries
with it the suffering associated with genetic disease. The faulty genetic counseling removes
the eugenic abortion choice from the parents.
8. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). The elements of a negligence cause
of action are: that the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care, that the defendant
breached that duty, that the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
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of a negligence cause of action presents a legal issue in wrongful
life litigation. Public policy is also an important issue in wrongful
life litigation. Recognition of this new tort must prove to be sound
policy before courts will open the door to a new class of litigants.
In some circumstances, policy issues merge with the negligence ele-
ments to present legal issues of whether sound policy recognizes
both a duty in genetic counseling situations and damages where
that duty is breached. The basic question involved in wrongful life
litigation underlies these legal issues: is there a right to recover
damages for negligence when the alternative is non-existence?9
The answer to this question influences how courts will view the
legal issues in wrongful life claims.
This Comment will show that wrongful life claims are viable
tort actions which can be effectively placed within the traditional
tort framework for establishing negligence. The Comment will ini-
tially examine the landmark decision in Curlender and then pro-
ceed to an in-depth analysis of each of the legal issues involved.
Analysis will show that wrongful life plaintiffs can establish all of
the elements of a negligence cause of action and that this claim,
supported by sound policy considerations, is thus a viable tort ac-
tion. The Curlender decision reflects this conclusion although the
court's analysis leaves some questions unanswered.
I. ANALYSIS OF CURLENDER
A. The Facts and Decision
The facts surrounding the Curlender controversy presented
the court with a classic claim for wrongful life damages.10 The
plaintiff's parents had retained the defendant laboratory to admin-
ister certain tests to determine if either parent or both were carri-
injury and that the plaintiff was in fact injured.
9. In essence, wrongful life plaintiffs want courts to recognize that some parents may
consider eugenic abortion as a remedy for predictable genetic disorders even though the
alternative for the child is non-existence. The parents need an opportunity to exercise that
choice.
10. The appellate court in Curlender was ruling on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
complaint as the defendant had successfully demurred to the complaint in the trial court.
The trial court sustained the demurrer in that the plaintiff had failed to plead a cause of
action. A demurrer in California has the effect of admitting all of the allegations in the
complaint but not the legal conclusions. This posture was important because it allowed the
court to accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and allowed the court to formulate the
cause of action based on these allegations.
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ers of genes which would cause their offspring to be born with Tay
Sachs disease, medically defined as amauratic familial idiocy.11 The
infant plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to perform the
tests properly and consequently misinformed the parents about
their carrier status.12 The plaintiff was born with Tay Sachs dis-
ease allegedly because of this negligence.13 It was further alleged
that due to the disease the plaintiff suffers from a variety of ex-
treme physical ailments including a limited life expectancy of four
years. 4
The court held that the plaintiff had established a legal cause
of action for wrongful life premised on the defendant's negli-
gence." The court concluded that the claim was consistent with
applicable California negligence principles and that the claim was
supported by public policy considerations.'
B. The Court's Analysis
Shauna Curlender's wrongful life claim was a case of first im-
pression in California. 17 Consequently, the court surveyed the deci-
sional law of other jurisdictions and found a progression in the law
towards recognizing an infant's cause of action even though other
courts had not recognized it.'" The court used the dissents in the
11. See Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) for
how that determination is made. See SCHmIDT'S ATTORNEYs' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE (1980).
Tay Sachs is a fatal progressive degenerative disease of the nervous system which primarily
affects the Eastern European Jewish population and their progeny. It is hereditary and it
affects children of four months to twelve years.
12. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 815, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 480 (1980).
13. Due to insufficient pleadings the court was unawart of whether the parents relied
on the laboratory's incorrect information in conceiving the plaintiff or whether they relied
on it in failing to avail themselves of amniocentesis. Id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. Appar-
ently, the two situations were indistinguishable to the court.
14. Other symptoms of Tay Sachs include mental retardation, susceptibility to other
diseases, convulsions, sluggishness, apathy, failure to fix objects with the eyes, inability to
take an interest in the surroundings, loss of motor reactions, inability to sit up or hold head
up, loss of weight, muscle atrophy, blindness, pseudobulpar palsy, inability to feed orally,
decerebrate rigidity, and gross physical deformity. Id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481-82.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Cf., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App.3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). The court dis-
tinguished Stills on the basis of the injury complained of. The plaintiff in Curlender exhib-
ited definite physical injury while in Stills the plaintiff's injury related to his status which
the court found to be a dubious injury in modern times.
18. The court made an exhaustive analysis of the related decisional law to determine if
[Vol. 30
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related case law to bring the issues into focus.19 The dissents con-
sistently pointed out that wrongful life plaintiffs are seriously in-
jured and that barring recovery sanctions professional misconduct
at the expense of the injured plaintiffs. Moreover, the dissents
properly focused their analysis on the duty owed to unborn via the
informed decision making of the parents. Once the court identified
the competing interests involved in wrongful life claims, it pro-
ceeded- to place the cause of action into California's negligence
framework.
The court analyzed the issue of duty in light of the public pol-
icy considerations formulated in Rowland v. Christian.20 Without
elaboration, the court found that it was sound policy to recognize a
legal duty owed the infant in genetic counseling situations. The
court described this duty as one of ordinary care under the circum-
stances, but did not include a further duty to accurately disclose
the test results to the parents although it was implicit in their rea-
soning and was alluded to later in the opinion.2' The duty to dis-
there was a recurring thread in the cases that had denied wrongful life claims. The argu-
ments and issues raised by the other cases will be discussed in Section IV of this Comment,
infra.
19. For example, the dissent in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 50, 227 A.2d 689, 703
(1967) (Jacobs, J. dissenting), argues strongly that the majority's decision sanctioned medi-
cal malpractice for no good reason. Additionally, Judge Jacobs criticized the majority's posi-
tion that the inability to compute damages required that they ban recovery.
The New Jersey Supreme Court retreated from a no damage position in Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). Nevertheless, they continued to ban recovery because
of public policy reasons. The dissent found this position untenable and argued that the duty
a medical practitioner owes an unborn mandates that the parents have the opportunity to
decide the unborn's future. Id. at 439-40, 404 A.2d at 18. This view properly focuses on the
duty due the unborn operating under an implicit agency theory.
Finally, Judge Cooke, dissenting in Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64,
397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977), looked to the state of the art of genetic counseling to find that,
given the advanced medical procedures available, it would not be unreasonable to at least
investigate for possible problems via a genotological history. His analysis was premised on
the informed decision making of the parents and the virtually miniscule added burden this
would place on the profession. Id. at 117, 366 N.E.2d at 69, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Cooke, J.
dissenting).
20. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). Before a legal duty is recog-
nized in California the court will analyze the following considerations: the forseeability of
harm to the plaintiff, the certainty of the injury, the defendant's conduct as a proximate
cause, the moral blame of the defendant, the deterrent factor, the burden on the defendant
and consequences on the community of imposing a duty, and the availability and the cost
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. The court apparently found that all of
these policy considerations favored recognition of wrongful life claims.
21. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 830, 165 Cal. Rptr.
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close should have been linked to the defendant's duty as part of
the professional standard of care for genetic counselors. This fail-
ure was critical to a sound analysis of the infant's cause of action.
After finding a duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant, the
court found a clear breach of that duty in this case. Proximate cau-
sation was the crucial legal issue facing the plaintiff according to
the court.
The court found proximate causation by looking at the plain-
tiff's condition. They concluded that the infant both existed and
suffered because of the defendant's negligence. Moreover, the in-
jury was also forseeable because the certainty of impairment was
present, for, if performed properly, the test would have definitively
indicated the presence of Tay Sachs. A much simpler view would
hold that the plaintiff suffered a definite injury which was forsee-
able by the defendant. Nevertheless, the court found that a wrong-
ful life claim is a viable negligence action and that recognition of
the claim depended upon public policy considerations.22
The court premised its policy analysis on the basic California
tort law policy that there should be a remedy for every wrong.28
Since Roe v. Wade24 had removed any public policy against abor-
tion per se from the analysis, the court concluded that deterrence
of professional misconduct was the essential social policy involved
and it tipped the scales in favor of the plaintiff. The court held
that a reverent appreciation for life combined with social policy
considerations gave the infant the right to be redressed for the se-
rious injury received as a result of the defendant's negligence.25
477, 488 (1980). The duty to accurately disclose the test results to the parents was discussed
in conjunction with intervening causation rather than with the defendant's duty of care.
The court found that if the parents were accurately informed they should be liable to the
infant if they allowed the birth in spite of negative genetic test results. This dicta was irrele-
vant to the case before the court and was worthless from a practical standpoint. It is simply
impossible for a severely retarded infant to sue his parents. The only possibility of the par-
ents being held liable would be if the state sued them on behalf of the child. Such a result is
highly unlikely.
22. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
23. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1968)
(concept of a remedy for every wrong used to find insurance company committed tort when
it failed to accept a reasonable settlement offer on behalf of the plaintiff thus exposing the
plaintiff to liability beyond the coverage of the policy).
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The landmark decision in Roe came after the Gleitman case
was decided in New Jersey. The Curlender court implied that a public policy against abor-
tion had influenced that decision and subsequent decisions based on Gleitman.
25. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 830, 165 Cal. Rptr.
592 [Vol. 30
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The court concluded its opinion by definitively structuring the
possible damages award."'
The Curlender court fashioned new law but its scant analysis
of the legal issues will create problems for future litigants. The
scope of the decision is unknown because of this factor. Although
the court was ruling on a laboratory's duty to an unborn plaintiff,
its superficial analysis will most likely be applied to physicians in
the future. The most disturbing aspect of the decision lies in the
formulation of the ordinary care standard for the duty owed the
plaintiff. An affirmative duty standard is more appropriate in these
situations and is implicit in the court's reasoning. The duty owed
is the key to the infant's cause of action because it relates to all of
the legal issues facing wrongful life plaintiffs. The strength of the
decision lies in the court's recognition of its responsibility to estab-
lish and limit a physician's duty in genetic counseling. 7 With this
principle as a backdrop, this Comment will show that wrongful life
claims are viable tort actions which are supported by sound legal
analysis. A more workable framework for wrongful life claims is
possible and it hinges on the formulation of an affirmative duty as
the professional standard of care in genetic counseling situations."
III. WRONGFUL LIFE-A NEGLIGENCE FRAMEWORK
A. Duty
The most important legal issue in wrongful life litigation con-
cerns the question of duty, the threshold issue in any negligence
action.29 The definition of duty in wrongful life cases is the essen-
477, 489 (1980).
26. Id. at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90. The court limited Shauna's damages to pain
and suffering over her limited life span plus any special pecuniary loss incurred because of
her impaired condition. The court specifically rejected a damages award which would be
based on a normal life or on a right not to be born, thus avoiding comparison with non-
existence. Moreover, structuring the award in this manner defeats the impossibility of com-
puting damages argument posited against the claim. Consequently, the award hardly
amounts to a windfall for the parents as the eventual recipients of the award.
27. The court borrowed this view from one commentator. See Note, Father and Mother
Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87
YALE L.J. 1488 (1978).
28. The Curlender court's analysis of the issues presented by wrongful life claims was
superficial, but the case illustrates the problems involved in wrongful life litigation. There-
fore, the decision will be used as a reference point when the cause of action is placed within
the negligence framework in this Comment.
29. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
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tial element in the cause of action because this definition will con-
trol the resolution of the remaining issues involved in wrongful life
litigation. It is important to focus on the care owed the infant in
genetic counseling situations as distinguished from the care owed
the parents.30 Proper focus on this duty will show that medical
personnel owe infant plaintiffs a duty of care; this duty is ade-
quately discharged only when the personnel involved meet an af-
firmative duty to screen for genetic defects as part of standard pre-
natal care. An affirmative duty standard is reasonable in genetic
counseling situations and the imposition of that standard can be
justified by a comprehensive analysis of the situation.
It is established that medical personnel owe a duty of care to
an unborn infant during prenatal treatment.31 Normally, the stan-
dard of care in any medical treatment process is one of reasonable
care, exercised by one with the professional skills and knowledge of
the ordinary medical practitioner.2 An ordinary care standard is
inappropriate in genetic counseling situations because there is no
single standard of norms established for genetic counselors. Ge-
netic counseling has developed too rapidly to have established
standards of care.3 3 Consequently, physicians clearly owe unborn
infants a duty of care but the nature of the duty is uncertain.
Normally, the medical profession formulates its own profes-
sional standard of care for a given medical process.3 4 This policy
recognizes that medical practitioners are professionals who are ac-
30. Proper focus on the duty owed the infant is extremely important to an analysis of
the infant's cause of action because the parents merely act as the child's agents after the
test results have been conveyed to them. The agency theory does not attach until that point.
31. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946). The court held that an infant could
recover damages for injuries received before birth which were caused by a physician's
malpractice.
32. See Napier v. Greenzweig, 256 F. 196 (2d Cir. 1919). The court formulated the stan-
dard to hold that a physician breached his duty of care to the plaintiff by applying a plastic
cast to the plaintiff's leg in a manner that cut off the plaintiff's circulation. See Harris v.
Fall, 177 F. 79 (7th Cir. 1910) (The standard is appropriately modified upward for profes-
sionals holding themselves out as possessing special skills in a particular field. Obstetricians
fall into this latter category.).
33. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 618 (1979),
for a discussion of how the emergence of genetic counseling as a discipline has created a
problem because there are no established standards to guide genetic counselors.
34. Mason v. Geddes, 258 Mass. 40, 154 N.E. 519 (1926) (testimony of fellow physicians
allowed to show that the defendant complied with the profession's established standard of
care). The case stands for the proposition that the medical profession is allowed to formu-
late their own standard of care guidelines for medical procedures.
594 [Vol. 30
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countable for their acts as a matter of ethical medical practice.3 5
Courts will only overturn the professional standard when it is pa-
tently unreasonable.38 Defining the standard of care in genetic
counseling situations thus requires an analysis of what the profes-
sion considers an appropriate standard of care for genetic
counselors.
The medical profession has been unable to agree on a single
professional standard of care for genetic counselors. One faction of
the profession urges a duty to test for the possibility of genetic
disease in a fetus only when prospective parents request such an
investigation and indicate an intent to abort if the test results indi-
cate the presence of a severe genetic defect.3 7 This formulation of
the standard is not supportable if focus is properly placed on the
duty owed the unborn plaintiff because it attempts to switch the
focus of the duty from the infant to his parents, thus mixing two
duties to the denigration of both. Moreover, this scheme assumes
that all prospective parents have considered the possibility of their
offspring having genetic disease. That presumption cannot be
maintained. Thus, it is virtually impossible for physicians to dis-
charge their duty to the fetus under an ordinary care standard. 8
Another group within the medical profession has advocated
that an affirmative duty to screen for genetic defects should be
the professional standard of care in prenatal practice.3 9 Under
35. The soundness of self-policing is buttressed by the fact that physicians must com-
ply with strict licensing procedures and are subject to loss of license or censure for profes-
sional misconduct. In New York the authority to revoke a license or censure a physician is
vested in the Board of Regents under the authority of the Education Law. See N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 610 (McKinney).
36. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 84 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (failure of
ophthamologist to test for glaucoma as standard part of eye examination was held to be
unreasonable in light of the easy and relatively inexpensive method available). This rarely
happens, but since human genetics is such a sensitive area it may be appropriate for courts
to impose the legal standards if the profession either fails to set a standard or sets an unrea-
sonable one. The law thus has an opportunity to aid in the establishment of realistic guide-
lines from the outset. For a discussion of this unique opportunity see Milunsky & Reilly,
The "New" Genetics: Emerging Medicolegal Issues in the Prenatal Diagnosis of Heredi-
tary Disorders in America, J.L. & MED. 71 (1 March 1975).
37. See, e.g., McKusick, The Growth & Development of Human Genetics as a Clinical
Discipline, 27 AM. J. HUM. GEN. 261 (1975). See also, Teplitz, Genetics, 241 J. AM. MED. A.
1397 (1979).
38. This position is obviously self-serving to physicians who want to limit their liability
as much as possible.
39. At a recent National Institute of Health conference, the members recommended
that obstetricians administer a standard questionnaire to parents who seek prenatal care to
1981]
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this standard obstetricians would screen all potential parents who
seek prenatal care for possible genetic defects in the fetus. This
standard would keep the focus of the duty owed on the fetus, and
blanket routine screening would be the only reasonable method
of discharging that duty. Moreover, it also avoids the problem
of to whom the physician owes a paramount duty in genetic
counseling.40
An affirmative duty standard is also reasonable in light of the
benefits gained from employing it. It is an antidote for the problem
of there being no established standard of care for genetic counsel-
ors to follow. Additionally, the minimal added expense of adminis-
tering a questionnaire as part of prenatal care is decidedly out-
weighed by the benefits which flow from accurate genetic
prediction. Even if the screening yielded a miniscule percentage of
cases warranting further investigation it would still be worth the
extra expense. The discharge of an affirmative duty, however, at-
taches significance to the information obtained in testing. This re-
sults in a further duty to adequately disclose the test results to the
parents. This added duty functions under the doctrine of informed
consent.41
determine if amniocentesis should be considered. See Antenatal Diagnosis: What Is Stan-
dard?, 241 J. AM. MED. A. 1666 (1979).
40. Capron, supra note 33. Professor Capron points out that medical practitioners may
face a problem in these situations because of their perception of their duty. The physician
may feel he has a paramount duty to insure the infant's birth, a paramount duty to protect
society from genetic disease burdens, or a paramount duty to treat the mother of the child.
This dilemma is solved by an affirmative duty standard as the professional standard of care.
For example, under the guise of protecting the fetus, some clinics will not disclose certain
negative diagnoses to parents for fear that they will abort. Professor Capron points out that
such non-disclosure can never be justified. Indeed, proper professional conduct should in-
clude full disclosure of all possible diagnoses and forms of treatment so that any treatment
decisions will be based on adequate information.
41. Informed consent had its genesis in cases where physicians were, in some way, in-
vading their patient's bodies. The patients were deemed to have consented to this invasion,
thus to have allowed the battery. Genetic counseling is only a first step toward an ultimate
invasion, but the severity of the resultant harm justifies invoking informed consent princi-
ples from the outset. This will ensure that the parents participate in all decisions germane
to the treatment. See Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (physician
breached duty of informed consent by failing to apprise the plaintiff of the risk involved in
X-ray procedure which caused plaintiff to receive radiation burns). This case formulated the
doctrine of informed consent and established its parameters. The elements of a breach of
informed consent include: the existence of a material risk unknown to the patient; the fail-
ure to disclose the risk to the patient; that the patient would have chosen a different course
of treatment had the risk been disclosed; and the injury resulted from the failure to use the
alternative treatment. See also Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974)
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After the results have been adequately disclosed to the par-
ents an agency theory attaches. Since unborn infants are incapable
of determining their choice of treatment, their parents become
their agents for that purpose. Consequently, to make an informed
decision about the possible use of eugenic abortion, the parents
must be accurately informed of the test results and the choices of
treatment available. It is, therefore, imperative that the further
duty to adequately disclose the test results become part of the pro-
fessional standard of care.42
The proper conclusion is that an affirmative duty standard of
care is the only reasonable standard for genetic counseling situa-
tions in light of the duty owed the fetus and the state of the art.4
Additionally, physicians have a duty to stay abreast of scientific
changes occurring in their field and genetic prediction is one of
those developments. 4" The only possible negative aspect of an af-
firmative duty standard is that it expands physicians' potential lia-
bility for malpractice during prenatal care.4 5
B. Breach of Duty
A breach of duty occurs anytime a defendant fails to comply
with a duty of care owed the plaintiff.46 Defining a breach of duty
(breach of informed consent found when physician failed to warn of all material risks pre-
sent in liver biopsy treatment when an alternative procedure was available). Thus, in preg-
nancy situations an alternative treatment is always present because the risk of genetic de-
formity is always present. The rule is ameliorated somewhat by the requirement that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving a breach of informed consent. Miller v. Kennedy, id.
Further, the physician can always justify nondisclosure when the well-being of the patient
dictates such. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (risk
involved in appendectomy justifiably withheld in view of patient's state of health and appre-
hension). It would be difficult for a genetic counselor to justify nondisclosure.
42. The agency theory is completely dependent upon adequate disclosure via informed
consent. This view does not entail an advocacy of abortion but merely advocates that the
parents' choice to abort be preserved. For other commentaries expounding the informed
consent view, see Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms to the Tradi-
tional Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1978); Note, Father and Mother
Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, supra
note 27.
43. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
44. See, e.g., Zotterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 153 N.W. 692 (1915) (physician not al-
lowed to plead ignorance of side effects of surgical process when it was established part of
treatment). Physicians thus have a duty to keep up with changes occurring in their field.
See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
45. This is a policy problem which will be discussed in Section IV infra.
46. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed, 1971).
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in genetic counseling situations turns entirely on the nature of the
duty owed unborn infants under the professional standard of care.
Presently, it would be virtually impossible to establish a breach
under an ordinary care standard due to the lack of a uniform stan-
dard.47 The Curlender court was able to apply that standard be-
cause the defendants' actions fell well below any standard. Since
not all cases are that easily resolved, a breach of duty is more read-
ily ascertainable under an affirmative duty professional standard of
care.
A breach of duty could arise in several instances under an af-
firmative duty standard. First, it would be a breach of duty to fail
to conduct the genetic screening. If the screening is performed it
would be a breach of duty to conduct the tests improperly so that
the results are incorrect. Finally, it would be a breach of duty to
fail to adequately disclose the results to the parents or, if ade-
quately disclosed, to fail to inform them of the alternative treat-
ment choice of abortion. If the screening yields results which indi-
cate further testing is necessary, it would be a breach to fail to
continue the investigation.48 If further testing is warranted, the
same types of negligent breaches could occur in subsequent testing
which may include amniocentesis. An affirmative duty standard of
care merely prescribes that physicians perform further tests if war-
ranted, perform them properly, and accurately disclose the results
to the parents.49
The formulation of an affirmative duty standard thus lends it-
self to defining specific situations where a breach of duty occurs.
Finding breaches in these situations ensures that physicians are
adequately discharging the duty they owe unborn infants. It also
has the desired effect of bringing the unborn's parents, as agents,
into the treatment process at an early stage when eugenic abortion
remains possible.50 As a legal policy matter a breach of duty under
47. See note 33 supra.
48. Further tests may entail blood tests and/or amniocentesis. See Howard v. Lecher,
42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
49. It may be argued that if parents indicate an intent not to abort, all further testing
should cease. This view is not tenable because the physician's duty to adequately disclose
the exact nature of all the risks present cannot be discharged until the tests confirm the
diagnosis. Moreover, the parents may wish to change their mind about abortion in face of
reliable information that the fetus has irreparable genetic disease.
50. Depending on the jurisdiction, the applicable state law may prohibit aborting a "vi-
able" fetus as defined in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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an affirmative duty standard is easier to prove. It also would pro-
tect medical personnel from unfounded claims because they could
more easily prove they had complied with the professional stan-
dard of care.
C. Proximate Causation
Wrongful life plaintiffs must also prove that the defendant's
breach of duty was the proximate cause of their injuries.51 Any fail-
ure by a physician to properly inform the parents about the un-
born's genetic makeup, thereby removing their choice to abort,
provides the proximate cause link to the plaintiff's injuries. Causa-
tion is established because adequate discharge of the defendant's
duty could have prevented the manifestation of the genetic disease
in the infant.
Proximate causation is usually analyzed in terms of the for-
seeability of the defendant's conduct causing injury to the plain-
tiff.52 Forseeability is best illustrated by the ability of physicians to
accurately predict the presence of some genetic diseases with near
100% accuracy.53 In those circumstances, the forseeability of injury
turns into a certainty of injury.5' If physicians adequately dis-
charge the duty owed to the fetus there is no proximate causal link
between their conduct and the injury. But if a breach of duty re-
sults in an injury, wrongful life plaintiffs face the problem of prov-
ing proximate causation.
Proof may be difficult to establish in wrongful life cases where
the tests were conducted but failed to indicate the genetic disease.
Normally, plaintiffs in medical malpractice litigation prove breach
of duty and causation by using expert testimony when the average
person is unfamiliar with the established standard of care.55 With-
51. See, e.g., McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 99 (1911).
52. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
53. The Curlender court focused on this aspect when they stated, "[T]he certainty of
genetic impairment is no longer a mystery." Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980).
54. See note 1 supra.
55. Any time the standard of care is not well-known or readily understandable by a lay
juror, it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish it and a breach of it using expert testi-
mony. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 519 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1975). For this and other
reasons, a simple unified standard of care for all people who function as genetic counselors
is most desirable. See Capron, supra note 33, at 623 n.17.
See Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974). Many problems are
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out a unifiell standard of care, however, there is little for an expert
to attest to. An affirmative duty standard together with the accu-
racy rate would provide strong proof of negligence in this situation.
Consequently, courts may apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to ameliorate the plaintiff's proof problem.86 Proof would be more
readily available and plaintiffs would be able to establish a case
without the need for a parade of experts. Consequently, an affirma-
tive duty standard of care would lessen many of the problems in-
herent in medical malpractice litigation.
Establishing proximate causation in wrongful life litigation de-
pends upon the nature of the physician's duty in genetic counsel-
ing situations. An affirmative duty standard would aid both plain-
tiffs and defendants if litigation results. An ordinary care standard
would only create many problems. Determining proximate causa-
tion, however, is the same under either standard; it is forseeable
that negligent genetic counseling could result in the birth of a ge-
netically defective infant because it removes the eugenic abortion
choice from the parents.
III. PUBLIC POLICY
Public policy considerations, including the issue of damages,57
have been the chief grounds for denying wrongful life claims in
associated with using expert testimony in medical malpractice actions. Among these are the
"conspiracy of silence" in which physicians are reluctant to testify against one another. See,
e.g., Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEv-MAR. L. REV. 520 (1965), and the conflicting
expert testimony offered at trial requiring juries to choose which expert they like best.
56. Literally, the thing speaks for itself. In negligence actions it is used to create an
inference or presumption that the defendant was negligent and caused the plaintiff's inju-
ries. See Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1967) (air-
plane crashes do not normally occur without someone's negligence causing them and, there-
fore, res ipsa loquitur applies). To apply the doctrine courts require that the defendant be
in exclusive control of the instrumentalities surrounding the event so that any information
and/or proof arising from the event is in the exclusive control of the defendant. See Bran-
non v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968). The doctrine is more amenable to medical
malpractice actions because, as a policy matter, the defendant is most likely to have access
to any proof of the negligence. Res ipsa loquitur allows plaintiffs to recover without requir-
ing them to "finger" the party responsible as there are a variety of medical personnel at-
tending to a patient in any medical process. Whether the doctrine creates an inference of
negligence or a presumption of negligence depends upon the jurisdiction. See George Foltis
Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1941). But see Schechter v. Hann,
305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947).
57. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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other jurisdictions."5 In Gleitman v. Cosgrove5 9 the court found
that the plaintiff had not suffered any legally cognizable damage
because it was logically impossible to measure such damage. Alter-
natively, the court found that a decision to allow recovery was a
negation of the value of life and, therefore, contrary to public pol-
icy.6 0 Twelve years later the New Jersey Supreme Court denied a
wrongful life claim solely on public policy grounds in Berman v.
Allan."1 The court concluded that sound policy required a finding
that any existence "with or without a physical handicap is more
precious than non-life. '62 The court thus eschewed any analysis
that failed to find that the infant plantiff had been injured, evi-
dencing significant retreat from that stance. The cases indicate
that public policy as it relates to damages or the cause of action in
general is used to bar recovery. This section will examine the vari-
ous policy arguments advanced against wrongful life claims. The
analysis shows that policy considerations actually favor recognition
of a wrongful life cause of action.
A. Damages
Courts create critical problems for wrongful life plaintiffs by
refusing to recognize any injury. The Gleitman court carried this
argument further by finding that even if the plaintiff had been le-
gally injured, the damages could not be computed because of the
impossibility of comparing life with infirmities to non-existence to
form a damage basis.63 These arguments are not defensible in light
of the proper analysis of the duty owed unborn plaintiffs by
physicians.
58. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). See also Speck v. Fine-
gold, 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979).
59. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689.
60. The court noted that, "[T]he Roe v. Wade case played a substantial part in the
partial retreat from the Gleitman holding by the New Jersey Supreme Court majority in
Berman v. Allan." Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 820, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477, 483 (1980). The court later referred to Roe v. Wade as having "monumental
implications" in the eugenic abortion area. Id. at 828, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
The Gleitman case was decided in 1967 before abortions were held to be constitutionally
protected in the Roe decision. Public policy at that time was conceivably anti-abortion.
61. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
62. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12-13.
63. Damages are compensatory and the usual method of calculation attempts to make
good the plaintiffs loss by a comparison of the plaintiff's situation before and after the
tortious act. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmEDIEs § 1.1 (1973).
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By refusing to find an injury, the court failed to focus on the
duty of care owed the infant. The plaintiff's birth, with its concom-
itant suffering, is an injury which could have been prevented but
for the defendant's negligence. The birth is a cognizable injury be-
cause of the implications it carries for the infant. Moreover, as the
dissent in Gleitman pointed out, barring recovery allows a serious
wrong to go unredressed while serving to provide no deterrent to
professional irresponsibility." A policy which ignores a severe in-
jury while shielding physicians from liability for malpractice is not
justifiable.
A recognition of damage in wrongful life cases should be pre-
mised on the infant's legal rights. 5 The plaintiff's pain and suffer-
ing gives him the right to seek damages from the physician who
stripped the infant's parents of the opportunity to prevent the
pain and suffering. The injury is cognizable and it seems uncon-
scionable to hold that an infant born with Tay Sachs disease has
suffered no legally cognizable injury as a policy determination. 6
Thus, the requisite injury is present and it can be shown that it is
possible to compute a damage award.
The Curlender court recognized that tort policy prescribes
that there be a remedy for every wrong committed. 7 This principle
permeates tort law and has lead to the formulation of actions for
many injuries which cannot be precisely compensated in dollars
and cents.68 Moreover, it is established that the difficulty of com-
puting damages does not justify denying liability.6 It is inconsis-
tent to find an injury but to bar recovery because the damages are
difficult to compute.70 Furthermore, computation of damages in
64. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
65. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 828, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 488 (1980).
66. See note 14 supra, for the symptoms of Tay Sachs disease alleged in the Curlender
complaint.
67. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 830, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 489 (1980). The court cited Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 18 (1967), to support this point. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
68. For example, property damage is usually amenable to a precise award of damages.
Personal injuries, on the other hand, are highly speculative because the value of a leg or an
arm or percentage thereof is not subject to a precise valuation.
69. Story Parchment v. Patterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
70. See D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 3.1, 3.33 (1973) and Kashi,
The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409 (1977); see
also Note, An Action for Wrongful Life Brought on Behalf of a Wrongfully Conceived In-
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any tort action is always arbitrary and speculative as the value of a
bodily injury is incapable of precise valuation. The impossibility of
computing damages argument fails under this analysis.
Proper analysis of wrongful life claims shows that wrongful life
plaintiffs have been seriously injured and that damages can be
computed. The Curlender court defined the parameters of the
plaintiff's damage award in a reasonable manner. 1 Public policy,
thus, should not be used to hold that wrongful life claimants are
lacking the requisite injury because a damage basis cannot be
formed.
B. The Value of Life as a Fundamental Principle of Our Society
The underlying theme of the other public policy arguments of
the Gleitman and Berman courts encompasses moral beliefs held
in our society concerning the value of life. The courts transposed
their subjective beliefs about the value of life into a public policy
against eugenic abortion as a remedy for genetic disease. This view
is not founded on legal analysis of wrongful life claims, but on
metaphysical principles. Nonetheless, the argument is formidable
because of the emotional impact on society of any decision that
supports the use of abortion. One commentator posited this argu-
ment by stating that it is a fundamental principle of our society
that each being is valuable. 2
The problem with this position is that it is a conclusion which
is not supportable either logically or empirically. Courts would not,
however, negate the value of life by allowing wrongful life plaintiffs
to recover damages. Allowing recovery would merely recognize that
(ant, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 712 (1977). These authors argue that courts are not incapable
of fashioning remedies for wrongful life plaintiffs. Professor Dobbs expressed disbelief that
this argument was used to defeat the cause of action.
71. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 831, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 490 (1980). See note 26 supra. The court would also award punitive damages if the
plaintiff could establish them, under the CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West), by showing that the
defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, either express or implied. Punitive
damages are awarded for exemplary reasons to punish the defendant. The practical effect of
the court's damages guidelines is that in many instances the cost of litigation will exceed the
potential recovery.
72. See Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979
W.U.L.Q. 919. The author analyzes the history of tort law to conclude that wrongful life is
not a tort within the traditional meaning of tort law. The author found that there must be
an injury to a person's dignity in order for a person to recover in tort and wrongful life
plaintiffs do not suffer such an injury by being born.
1981]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
infant plaintiffs are seriously injured by professional malpractice in
wrongful life cases. The injury gives them the right to be redressed.
Moreover, as with terminally ill patients, it may not be correct to
hold that life with infirmities is more precious than non-existence.
Such a value judgment is beyond the scope of the court's author-
ity. Finally, it is questionable whether it is a fundamental principle
of our society that each being is valuable.73 Assuming arguendo the
validity of the proposition, the principle should also include a re-
spect for a person's right to live, if possible, free from pain and
suffering.
The policy analysis of the Gleitman and Berman courts was,
therefore, of dubious validity. If the values they espoused are prop-
erly analyzed under public policy principles, the only conclusion
possible is that the principles favor recognition of the cause of
action.
C. The Added Burden on the Medical Profession-Defensive
Medicine
It is also argued by some that liability for wrongful life claims
places an undue burden on the medical profession that will hinder
effective medical practice.7" The logical extension of this argument
is that physicians will practice defensive medicine to avoid liabil-
ity. The added use of medical procedures where they were not
used previously is certainly a waste of valuable resources if this
argument has any force. While this argument may be somewhat
tenable under an ordinary care standard, it is wholly obviated by
an affirmative duty standard of care.
Defensive medicine is not a problem when the physician is
merely complying with the professional standard of care in any
given medical procedure. Screening for genetic defects as part of
73. The fact that abortions are constitutionally protected and that states may constitu-
tionally execute prisoners for capital offenses leads one to question whether it is valid to
hold that it is a fundamental principle of our society that each being is valuable.
74. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
Defensive medicine (as it flows from an added burden on the medical profession) was one of
the major concerns of the New York Court of Appeals in denying recovery for wrongful life
torts.
75. See, e.g., S. LAw & S. POLAN, PArN AND PROFIT (1978). Defensive medicine refers to
the overemployment of medical procedures for the purpose of avoiding legal liability rather




standard prenatal care would be proper medical procedure rather
than defensive practice. Consequently, amniocentesis will only be
utilized in cases where it should be used." It could only be used
defensively under an ordinary care standard. Moreover, improved
technology will undoubtedly make genetic prenatal investigation
mandatory in the future. The burden of an affirmative duty will,
thus, be merged into the professional standard of care in the future
even if it is not accepted at this point. Imposition of an affirmative
duty standard at this point is reasonable as it defeats the problems
posed by defensive medicine.
Public policy considerations should include the desire to pro-
mote effective medical practice without encouraging the practice of
defensive medicine. An affirmative duty standard would meet this
goal. The added burden of an affirmative duty is also decidedly
outweighed by the benefits that will flow from such a standard. 8
The procedure used to investigate possible genetic problems is too
simple and inexpensive to constitute an added burden on the
profession.
D. Social Policy
Opponents of wrongful life actions also argue that even if the
claim is recognized the recovery of a few plaintiffs will not alter the
incidence of genetic disease.79 Thus, allowing the cause of action
will not remedy the social side effects of genetic disease. Careful
analysis of the social aspects of genetic disease will show that social
policy considerations favor, rather than disfavor, allowing the
cause of action.
Allowing the cause of action will admittedly not lead to the
77. Amniocentesis entails a risk of injury in less than 1% of the women it is performed
on. This rate should not be affected by an affirmative duty standard. See The Report to the
Medical Research Council by their Working Party on Amniocentesis, An Assessment of the
Hazards of Amniocentesis, 85 BRrr. J. OB. & GYN. 1 (Supp. II 1978).
78. The argument fails under a pure cost/benefit analysis. For example, it also costs
more to immunize children from polio but it cannot be maintained that the cost of the
procedure should mandate its discontinuance. While the example is extreme, it illustrates
that a certain amount of increased cost is necessary to promote advances in medicine. The
minimal added expense of administering a questionnaire cannot defeat the need for it.
Moreover, it can only be conjectural at this point whether allowing the cause of action will
increase the cost of prenatal care because increases in malpractice insurance will be passed
on to the medical consumer.
79. See Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1494 (1978).
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eradication of genetic disease. An affirmative duty standard of care
would, however, eventually tend to lessen the burden of genetic
disease on society because more parents would be given the oppor-
tunity to prevent the manifestation of the disease in their off-
spring. This is important in view of the staggering social burden
genetic disease imposes on society.80 Recognizing these burdens,
the Curlender court concluded that social policy should be con-
cerned with social welfare as it relates to sound medical practice. 1
Social interests, therefore, dictate that the law establish and
limit the duty of physicians in genetic counseling situations.2
Moreover, it cannot be maintained that allowing wrongful life
claims is injurious to social welfare because allowing recovery
should at least foster more efficient prenatal care. In this instance
social policy considerations favor allowing the cause of action. The
prospect of genetic manipulation in the future serves to buttress
this argument.
E. Dual Recovery and Fraud
It is also argued that allowing both the parents and the infant
to recover for the same negligent act amounts to a dual recovery.
There is, however, no dual recovery in wrongful life cases because
both parents and child suffer distinct injuries. The child's injury
pertains to his birth,8 while his parents' injury is economic8 4 and/
or emotional.8 5 These injuries are clearly distinguishable. More-
over, no dual recovery exists in fact, even though the parents re-
ceive the damages awards for both injuries. Careful structuring of
80. See, e.g., A. Day & B. Holmes, The Incidence of Genetic Disease in a University
Hospital Population, 25 AM. J. HuM. GEN. 257 (1973). The study showed that 20% of all
hospitalized children deaths and 40% of all childhood deaths are attributable to genetic
disease. Accord, P. RzLLY, GENETIcs LAw AND SociL POLICY (1978).
81. See Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1494 (1978). The Curlender court cites
this article to buttress their argument on this point. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laborato-
ries, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 824, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487 (1980).
82. Id. at 821, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
83. Id.
84. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895. A finding
of liability to one of the plaintiffs would not be res judicata to the other plaintiff. The only
res judicata effect would be that the plaintiff in the second action could claim that the
defendant was collaterally estopped from claiming no negligence if the first action found so.
85. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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the infant's damages award, as done in Curlender,ee ensures that
the infant's award will cover the cost of care. Consequently, par-
ents receive no financial windfall when they receive the infant's
damages.
The possibility of fraudulent claims arising by allowing a
wrongful life cause of action is obviated by an affirmative duty
standard. If a physician can prove adequate compliance with this
standard of care it would be impossible to advance a fraudulent
claim. Moreover, it would also be very difficult to feign the requi-
site genetic disease in the infant. Consequently, there is no merit
to the dual recovery or fraud arguments.8 7
F. Tort Policy
The emergence of wrongful life claims requires an analysis of
whether the claim falls within recognized tort law policies, princi-
pally compensation and deterrence.88 The purpose of compensation
is to make a plaintiff whole for the injury received.89 Money dam-
ages are awarded because there are no other remedial measures
available.90 In wrongful life cases money damages will enable in-
fants to relieve the cost burden that their genetic disease places on
their parents or society. Since the disease could have been pre-
vented by adequate genetic counseling, compensation for the resul-
tant injury is consistent with a policy that shifts costs to the re-
sponsible party, especially when there is insurance available to
86. The structure of the damages award is illustrated in note 71 supra.
87. Another argument along this line was discussed by the Curlender court. The court
answered those who argue that if the claim is allowed that there would be nothing stopping
infants from extending the cause of action to suits against the infants' parents. The court
found no reason to shield the parents in such situations if they allowed the child's birth in
spite of negative test information. For the practical problems involved in this approach, see
note 21 supra. The only possible legal theory in which this could occur would entail gross
neglect within state statutes allowing such actions. See Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in
Child Abuse Cases, 54 CHI.-KENr L. Rav. 753 (1978).
88. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CuRR. LEG. PROB. 137 (1951). For a dis-
cussion of the goals of tort law as they relate to justice and public policy, see G. CAABRESi,
THE COSTS OF Accmmrrs (1970). Professor Calabresi argues that any deterrent effect is
largely theoretical. This argument is not dispositive of a deterrent effect under an affirma-
tive duty standard of care in genetic counseling situations because such a standard would
deter noncompliance if liability for wrongful life were attached to failure to exercise the
duty. See also Capron, supra note 33, at 857-58.
89. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 88.





Deterrence of professional misconduct may also be accom-
plished by allowing the cause of action. Justice Bryan, dissenting
in the Gleitman case, summed up this policy best by stating that
barring recovery "permits a wrong with serious consequential in-
jury to go wholly unredressed. That provides no deterrent to pro-
fessional irresponsibility .. ."I" Allowing wrongful life claims is
clearly consistent with a policy of deterrence. Moreover, it is an
insufficient deterrent to compensate only the parents because the
object of deterrence in wrongful life cases is to encourage compli-
ance with a duty of care owed to the unborn infant. Again, proper
focus on the duty owed the unborn is crucial to this analysis.
Wrongful life claims are thus clearly consistent with the goals
of tort law. Consequently, there are no public policy arguments
which are dispositive of the cause of action. The public policy ar-
guments examined herein show that public policy supports finding
wrongful life claims as viable tort actions.
CONCLUSION
There exists a clear tendency in tort law to compensate all
persons who have been injured by another's wrong. 3 Wrongful life
claims are viable tort actions which should be brought under this
umbrella. The Curlender decision indicates that the law is willing
to extend legal protection to infants who are injured by negligent
genetic counseling.
The legal impediments involved in wrongful life litigation can
be overcome by wrongful life plaintiffs and the claim can conse-
quently be placed into the traditional tort framework for establish-
ing negligence actions. Analysis of the cause of action shows that
the legal issues involved are largely dependent on the nature of the
duty owed the unborn infant by medical professionals.
An affirmative duty standard of care is the only reasonable
standard to impose on genetic counselors in light of the legal issues
present. An affirmative duty standard is also a panacea for many of
the public policy arguments advanced against the claim. Moreover
91. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). For
a general discussion of the effect of tort law on shifting costs and other tort objectives see
CALABREsi, supra note 88.
92. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 37, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 35-36, 227 A.2d at 703.
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that standard brings wrongful life claims into proper focus by illu-
minating the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury. Even if an affirmative duty standard is not im-
posed at this time, it will certainly be considered as ordinary pre-
natal care in the future as the technology of the field grows. In
light of the desire to have a uniform ethical standard of care for
geneticists to follow, it is logical to formulate an affirmative duty
standard at this point.
The cases that preceded Curlender illustrate that the judiciary
was perplexed by the cause of action." The precedential impact of
those decisions is severely hampered by the lack of a unifying
thread running through those cases. Moreover, the policy consider-
ations used to defeat wrongful life claims in the past are subject to
critical scrutiny. An analysis of those policies shows that they favor
allowing the claim, or at least they are not dispositive of it.
The competing interests at stake in wrongful life litigation also
affect an analysis of the cause of action. The infant's interest in
avoiding an existence fraught with pain and suffering decidedly
outweighs the physician's interest in avoiding liability. The pros-
pect of further development of the science of human genetics
makes it easier to meet the infant's interest in these cases. The
possibility in the future of genetic construction and reconstruction
mandates that the law become involved in establishing appropriate
guidelines for the profession to protect the unborn infants' inter-
ests before they are adversely affected. Wrongful life claims are
thus one avenue open to legal control of this highly sensitive
science.
The impact the Curlender decision will have on future wrong-
ful life litigation is unclear. It could open the door to wrongful life
plaintiffs or it could be limited to its facts. 5 At a minimum the
94. See note 4 supra.
95. Two recent decisions have refused to follow the Curlender analysis. In Phillips v.
United States, 508 F.Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980), the court down-played the Curlender decision
because it emanated from an intermediary California appellate court. They neglected, how-
ever, to note the effect of the California Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision by
finding that the refusal's meaning is unclear. Moreover, the Phillips court limited Curlender
to cases involving pre-conception negligence although it was not clear whether that was the
case and whether the Curlender court's holding was so limited. Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480. Even if the Phillips court
characterized the facts correctly, it is difficult to understand what distinguishes pre-concep-
tion negligence from post-conception negligence when both result in the same injury. See
also Roback v. United States, 503 F.Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1980), where that court also refused
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decision broke legal ground for wrongful life plaintiffs, even if the
court's analysis was questionable. The case stands for the basic
proposition that parents must be given the opportunity to prevent
their offspring from experiencing the severe pain and suffering as-
sociated with genetic disease. A major unanswered question, how-
ever, concerns the parameters of the cause of action.
Since parents are allowed to legally abort any fetus in pre-
scribed circumstances, the major problem lies in the limits of phy-
sicians' liability. Courts will have to decide what constitutes a suffi-
cient genetic injury to warrant holding a physician liable.e8
Circumstances will exist where a wrongful life plaintiff can estab-
lish a cause of action, but the injury may be de minimis in view of
the alternatives facing the child. The limits of the cause of action
are thus a formidable question.17
The conclusion is that wrongful life is a viable tort claim
under applicable tort law standards which is supported by public
policy considerations. The key to effective legal analysis of the
claim is the formulation of an affirmative duty to screen for genetic
defects as part of the professional standard for prenatal care. The
future of the cause of action will depend largely on how the law
establishes and limits that duty. 8
ROBERT C. SCHWENKEL
to follow the Curlender court's reasoning.
96. To illustrate this aspect one might look to hypothetical cases: Is a missing limb a
sufficient injury to justify imposing liability? If so, is a missing finger? There are an infinite
number of genetic defects which could occur in a fetus in the nuclear age. The result is that
the courts will inevitably be called upon to draw lines on where liability for genetic defects
will stop.
97. A discussion of the limits of the cause of action is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
98. The Curlender court stated emphatically that recognition of the claim would not
involve future courts in the task of defining the extent of liability. The position is untenable
in light of the analysis in note 96 supra.
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